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EX POST FACTO IN THE CONSTITUTION 
A NY study of the ex post facto clauses of the Constitution1 which did not commence with a consideration of Calder v. 
Bull2 would not conform to good practice. The text writers and 
the commentators uniformly begin their treatment of ex post facto 
laws by citing it as the leading case, and setting forth its doctrine. 
There is singular agreement as to the correctness of the l)olding of 
the case.3 The statement given by Cooley is typical: "At an early 
day it was settled by authoritative decision, in opposition to what 
might seem the more natural and obvious meaning of the term ex 
post facto, that in their scope and purpose these provisions were 
confined to laws respecting criminal punishments, and had no rela-
tion whatever to retrospective legislation of any other description."4 
This doctrine of Calder v. Bull is so well settled as to have become 
one of the commonplaces of American constitutional law. 
Though the doctrine be well settled at present, it did not go 
unchallenged at the time of its enunciation. Both jurists and com-
mentators questioned its soundness during the early part of the 
nineteenth century. Story, while accepting the ruling of the case, 
does so largely upon the ground that it had been long settled as 
correct law, and intimates that if the question were to be reopened 
he would be willing to give a different interpretation serious con-
1 Constitution of the United States, art. I, sec. 9, clause 3; also sec. IO, 
clause 1. 
2 3 Dallas 386 (1798)'. 
3 Cf. COOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Ed. 3), p. 3I2; KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON A:r.rERICAN LAW (Ed. I2, Holmes), vol. 1, p. 409; McCLAIN, 
CoNSTITUTIO:>rAL LAW IN THE FNITED STATES (1905), p. gS; WILLOUGHBY, 
ON THE CONSTITUTION, vol. 2, p. 8o3; HALL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, p. 93; 
WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS HISTORY, APPLICA-
TION AND CONSTRUCTION (1910), vol. I, p. 739; Br.ACK, HANDBOOK OF AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, p. 709; MII.LER LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
oF THE UNITED STATES (r8gI), p. 586. These writers vary somewhat as to 
the degree of positiveness with which they set forth this doctrine, some 
merely stating that the case is a leading one and that its doctrine is 
the law; others assert that the case is the correct exposition of the Con-
stitution. 
4 CooI.EY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (Ed. 7), p. 373. 
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sideration.5 Justice William Johns0n of the Supreme Court severely 
cl.'iticised the decision of Calder v. Bull.6 Professor Corwin, writing 
of Fletcher v. Peck in "John Marshall and the Constitution," por-
trays Marshall as disapproving of the ruling of the court in the 
C~lder case.1 
The issue involved in the case of Calder v. Bull was whether an 
act of the Connecticut legislature which set aside a decree of a 
probate court was ex post facto or not. · In other words, did civil 
cases come within the prohibition restraining the states from passing 
any ex post facto law? While each of the justices sitting in the 
case filed an opinion, that of Justice Chase is generally accepted 
as the definitive exposition of ex post facto laws. He based his 
opinion upon the usage of the term ex post facto in the state con-
stitutions, its usage at common law, its position in the text of the 
Constitution of the United States, and the intent of the framers 
of the Constitution. 
Of the justices who sat in the case, only one was a member of 
the convention which framed the Constitution.8 For this reason 
it is not possible to accept the assertion of Justice Chase, without 
5 STORY, CoMMENTARttS ON THE CONSTITUTION (Ed. 5, Bigelow), vol. 2, 
p. 2I9. Concerning the argument that ex post facto laws should be inter-
preted to mean laws affecting civil as well as criminal cases, Story says: 
"As an original question, the argument would be entitled to grave consid-
eration. * * *" 
6 See his opinion in Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters 4r4, and also 
Appendix, note r, p. 681. Of this exposition of the meaning of the term 
as used in the Constitution, Story wrote: "The terms, ex post facto laws, 
·in a comprehensive sense, embrace all retrospective laws, or laws governing 
or controlling past transactions, whether they are of a civil or a criminal 
nature. And there have not been wanting learned minds that have contended, 
with no small force of authority and reasoning, that such ought to be the 
interpretation of the terms in the Constitution of the United States." In a 
note, Story refers directly to Johnson's opinion. STORY, COMMENTARIES 
(Ed. 5), vol. 2, p. 2I9, and note I. 
7 CORWIN, ]OHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION, p. 154: "However, 
Marshall apparently fails to find entire satisfaction in this argument, for he 
next turns to the prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto 
laws with a question which manifests disapproval of the decision in Calder 
v. Bull. Yet he hesitates to overrule Calder v. Bull, and indeed, even at the 
very end of his opinion, he still declines to indicate clearly the basis of his 
decision." 
s ] ustice ·Patterson. 
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confirmation from the records of the Federal convention itself, 
when he says: "All the restrictions contained in the Constitution 
of the United States on the power of the State legislatures were 
provided in favor of the authority of the Federal government.. The 
prohibition against their making any ex post facto laws was intro-
duced for greater caution, and very probably arose from the knowl-
edge that the Parliament of Great Britain claimed and exercised a 
power to pass such laws under the denomination of bills of attain-
der, or bills of pains and penalties; the first inflicting capital, and 
the other less, punishment. * * * To prevent such, and similar, acts 
of violence and injustice, I believe, the Federal and State Legislatures 
were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder, or ex post facto 
law."9 We may also be allowed to test his statement that the term 
ex post facto was used in a technical sense in the Constitution, by 
whatever evidence is available. Did the framers of the Constitu-
tion use the term ex post facto in a technical sense, did the people 
who were members of the state conventions which ratified the Con-
stitution understand it to be used in a technical sense, and what 
was the general meaning attributed to the term by common usage 
at that time? The answer to __ these questions if affirmative, would 
give historical support to the position taken by Justice Chase. If 
the answers be negative, they would seem to weaken his position 
considerably. The purpose of this study is to determine, if pos-
sible, what was included in the term ex post facto when it was 
placed in the Constitution of the United States. On account of the 
meagerness of the information which we have concerning the debates 
in both the federal convention and the state ratifying conventions, 
it is almost impossible to give an unqualified answer to these 
questions. _ 
The ex post facto clauses were late in being incorporated into 
the Constitution. The first attempt to place a prohibition upon 
Congress with respect to the passage of ex post facto laws occurred 
in the session of Wednesday, August 22, when Madison reports 
that "Mr. Gerry & Mr. McHenry moved to insert after the 2d. sect. 
Art: 7, the Clause following, to wit, The Legislature shall pass no 
bill of attainder nor any ex post facto law."10 Gerry spoke in favor 
u 3 Dallas 389. 
10 HuN'.l', GAir.t.ARD, AND Scon, ]A"H~ BROWN, YADISON's Di:iiA'l'tS (Inter-
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of the motion, expressing the opinion that there was more need for 
such a prohibition on the national legislature than on the state legis-
latures. Gouverneur Morris opposed that portion of the motion 
dealing with ex post facto laws, but favored that portion forbidding 
bills of attainder. Ellsworth and !Wilson both thought it unneces-
sary to prohibit ex post.facto laws, the latter thinking that it would 
reflect ignorance of the "first principles of legislation." There 
seemed to be agreement as to the desirability of prohibiting Con-
gress from passing bills of attainder, and this portion of the motion 
was agreed to. The second part of the motion was then taken up. 
Carroll observed that legislatures had passed ex post facto laws 
and they had taken effect, regardless of the views of th~ people. 
Wilson opposed any prohibition on Congress in this matter, saying 
that if they had proven to be of no use in the state constitutions 
they would be of no use in the Federal Constitution, and that "both 
sides will agree as to the principle, but will differ as to its applica-
tion." Williamson called attention to the fact that such a prohibi-
tion existed in the constitution of North Carolina, and that while 
it had been disregarded it had nevertheless served as a guide to 
the judges. But Doctor Johnson thought the clause unnecessary 
"and implying improper suspicion of the National Legislature." 
Rutledge favored the clause. The vote on the latter portion of the 
motion resulted in its passage.11 There is nothing in Madison's 
record which gives any light on whether the term was used in a 
technical sense or not. 
The next mention ·made of the term in Madison's debates is in 
connection with a prohibition on the states. "Mr. King moved to 
add, in the words used in the Ordinance of Congs. establishing new 
. States, a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts."12 
national ed.), p. 449. It will be noted that bills of attainder and' e~ post 
facto laws were to be placed in another connection in the next report of 
the Committee of Detail. The discussion at this point was in connection 
with Article VII, section 2, as reported by the Committee of Detail, August 
6. See above, p. 341. 
11 HuNT & Scott, op. cit., p. 450. The vote by states is given by Madison 
as follows: uN. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. 
Md. ay. Virga. ay. N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay." Connecticut, New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania voted against the prohibition. 
12 Ibid., p. 478. Session of Tuesday, August 28. 
EX POST FACTO JN THE CONSTITUTION 319 
But Gouverneur Morris thought that this was going too far. His 
opinion was that "within a state itself a majority must rule, what-
ever may be the mischief done among themselves." Sherman then 
asked, "Why then prohibit bills of credit?" Col. Mason also seemed 
to think that the prohibition was extreme, for he believed that there 
were cases where a state must make provisions and it was not 
proper to tie the hands of the state in the matter. Wilson answered 
that "retrospective interferences only are to be prohibited." At this 
point Madison asked a very significant question, "Is not that already 
done by the prohibition of ex post facto laws, which will oblige the 
Judges to declare such interferences null & void?" Mr. Rutledge 
moved instead of Mr. King's motion to insert, "nor pass bills af 
attainder nor retrospective laws," on which motion the vote was 
seven to three in favor of the motion.13 
From the conversation which Madison reports a number of sig-
nificant facts are to be learned. One of the most striking things 
in this connection is Madison's question. He is evidently of the 
impression that ex post facto applies to civil as well as to criminal 
matters. It is odd that no member of the Convention -took the 
trouble to inform him that he was laboring under a serious mis-
apprehension. It is hardly credible that such a slip should be per-
mitted without some member calling it to his attention. Madison 
does not record any answer given to his query. 
Another fact of interest is the connection in which the matter 
arose. The conversation evidently began over a proposed prohibi-
tion on the states regarding contracts. Contracts are a severely 
civil matter. Rutledge's motion was a substitute for the motion 
offered by King. Shortly ·before this took place Sherman had 
expressed his opinion t~at this was "a favorable crisis for crushing 
paper money."14 The whole setting _of the debate was civil in 
character. 
For the purpose of this study the wording of the substitute motion 
which was offered by Rutledge is very important. This was the 
motion which was adopted. It read, as reported by Madison, "nor 
pass bills of attainder nor retrospective15 laws." In a note Madison 
1a HUNT & SCOTT, op. cit., 479. 
14 Ibid., 478. 
1G Ibid., 479. (Italics are mine.) 
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calls attention to t~e fact that the printed Journal contains the 
words "ex post facto" instead of retrospective.16 FARRAND'S edition 
of the RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION . OF 1787 gives the 
same note by Madison, but in an additional note gives the follow-
ing: "The Journal is correct, according to marginal notes in the 
Washington and Bready copies of the report of the Committee of 
Detail."17 For the purPose of this study it is not decisive which of 
these may be correct. It is evident that the two terms, ex post facto 
and retrospective, were used synonymously. . It is improbable that 
Madison alone understood the terms to have the meaning he 
attaches to them. It is hard to escape the conclusion that in this 
connection at least the members of the convention did not have in 
mind the technical meaning of ex post facto laws. During the 
entire debate recorded in this connection there is a notable absence 
of anything pertaining to criminal affairs. 
The following day, August 29, Mr. Dickinson "mentioned to the 
House that on examining BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, he found 
that the terms 'ex post facto' related to criminal cases only; that 
they would not consequently restrain the States from retrospective 
laws in civil cases, and that some further provision for this purpose 
would be requisite."18 The speaker injected this as a sort of an 
observation; it had no bearing on what was before the Convention · 
at the time. He had evidently made it a point to look up his BLACK-
STONE on the subject. It must be remembered that Dickinson was 
a lawyer of repute. He probably had been in doubt concerning the 
proceedings on the previous day and had gone to BLACKSTONE to 
settle the matter. He could hardly have been certain of the mean-
ing of the term the day before, else he would have brought it to the 
attention of the Convention, for he did not hesitate to do so when 
he had satisfied himself as t~ BLACKSTONE'S definition of it. Again, 
he must have thought that there were others in the Convention who 
were either in doubt or ignorance, for he advised that some further 
16 HUNT & Scott, op. cit., p. 479, note (*) at bottom of page. 
17 FARRAND, RscoRDS oF '.!:'HE FEDERAL Co~NTION oF 1787, vol. 2, p. 440, 
note 19. In answer to an inquiry from the writer, Mr. Gaillard Hunt, one 
of the editors of MADISON'S DEBATES cited above, gave his opinion on this 
note. He said, "I think they were used in the same signification in this 
note,'' in speaking of retrospective and e~ post facto. 
18 HuNT & Sc<>TT, op. cit., p. 483. 
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provision should be made. He must also have felt that many of 
the members believed that they had restrained the states in civil 
as well as criminal matters by placing a prohibition upon them in 
the passage of ex post facto laws. Othenvise his admonition would 
have been unnecessary. One must conclude that his colleagues 
needed enlightenment. Dickinson was a man of great wealth.20 
Late in the Convention, Friday, September 14, Col. Mason moved 
to strike out from the clause (art. I, sec. 9), "no bill of attainder 
nor any ex facto law." He thought it; not sufficiently clear that the 
prohibition meant by this phrase was limited to cases of a criminal 
nature, "and no Legislature ever did or can altogether avoid them 
in Civil cases." Gerry seconded the motion, but with a view "to 
e::>..i:end the prohibition to 'Civil cases'; which he thought ought to 
be done."21 
Here we get a glimpse of what may have been in Gerry's mind 
when he moved for a similar prohibition on the Congress of the 
United States. He seemed to think that they should comprehend 
civil as well as criminal cases. Othenvise, why extend the meaning 
in the prohibition on states? Mason must have felt that the Con-
vention did not make it plain enough that they meant only criminal 
cases. Mason's motion was to limit the meaning of the clause to 
criminal cases and the Convention refused to do so. His motion 
was defeated. Mason enumerated this as one of the reasons for 
his opposition to the Constitution.22 
In summing up the evidence as it appears in the debates in the 
Federal Convention, it seems as though it can be said with accuracy 
that the framers of the Constitution did not give evidence of using 
the term e:r post facto in a technical sense. The tendency seemed 
to be to impart a civil meaning to the term; there is no evidence of 
the term being used in a different connection. It is constantly 
referred to in speaking of civil affairs, as contracts or paper money. 
It is also noticeable that there is not a single mention of the practice 
of the British Parliament to which Justice Chase referred in his 
opinion in Calder v. Bull. It is possible that this may have been a 
factor in causing the framers to insert the ex post facto provision 
20 BEARD, op. cit., p. 87. 
21 HUNT & Scon, op. cit., p. 565. 
22 FARRAND, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 636. 
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in the Constitution, but it is not discernible in the debates on the 
point. Evidently, very different factors prompted them to insert 
the words in the Constitution. It is more than probable, judged by 
the debates themselves, that these men thought more of. contracts 
and paper money in this connection than any lessons which might 
be learned from British parliamentary practice. They had expe-
rienced bills of attainder and ez post facto laws in the colonies 
themselves, and had little need to reach across the water for in~truc­
tion in this matter. The fact that these men did think of safe-
guarding the paper money of that day, and their contracts, is not 
derogatory in the least. It may or may not have been caused by 
self-interest. But a sufficient explanation can be found in the ideas 
prevalent in the eighteenth century. Protections such as these were 
considered as essential to liberty as the personal liberty of citizens. 
Property protection was as vital as personal protection. Then, too, 
it cannot be denied that there were many at that time who J;ield large 
sums of paper money and who feared that action on the part of 
state legislatures would injure the value of this money. This appears 
in the conventions held in the various states for the purpose of 
ratifying the Constitution, and has been hinted at in studies which 
have been made of the ·Constitution. 
A study of the available records of the state ratifying conven-
tions is informative. This information is not important because of 
its amount but rather from its character. Many of the delegates 
to the convention which framed the Constitution were also dele-
gates to the state conventions which ratified the Constitution. In 
the Virginia convention such men as Marshall, Madison, Henry, 
Mason and Randolph were delegates. Some of these had also 
taken part in framing the Constitution. The opposition to the Con-
stitution was quite bitter in the Virginia convention, and the oppo-
sition leaders, Henry and Mason, made many long speeches against 
the adoption of the instrument. The debates for the Virginia con-
vention are quite well reported and a number of speeches are given 
on the ez post facto clauses in the Constitution. 
Henry refused to be convinced that there was no need of a bill 
of rights in the Constitution because of the prohibitions on the Con-
gress contained in the ninth section of article one. He brushed 
aside this contention by saying that these guarantees were so "feeble 
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and few, that it would have been infinitely better to have said 
nothing about it." But it was when he came to the subject of paper 
money that Patrick Henry became eloquent. He was very much 
afraid that the Northern states would force Virginia to help pay 
for paper money which when acquired was nearly worthless, but 
which the holders expected to redeem at a goodly rate as soon as 
the new government had been instituted. In this connection he 
came upon the e% post facto provision. He said: "If ex post facto 
laws had not been interdicted, they might also have been extended 
by implication at pleasure. Let us consider whether this restriction 
is founded in wisdom or good policy. If no ex post facto laws be 
made, what is to become of the old Continental paper dollars? Will 
not this country be forced to pay in gold and silver, shilling for 
shilling?"23 Henry evidently considered e% post facto laws as being 
able to disturb civil matters, as, for example, currency. Henry was 
a lawyer and should have been acquainted with the meaning of the 
term, and if it were used in a technic~l sense should have restricted 
the use of the word to such a meaning. As a matter of fact, Henry 
was attacked by Randolph for failing to use the term in its tech-
nical sense. Randolph pointed out that e% post facto laws had ref-
erence only to criminal cases.24 \While it may not have any bearing 
on the matter, it might be mentioned here that Randolph held $r6,ooo 
of this paper money of which Mason and Henry were so afraid.25 
This may or may not have been a factor in the controversy. Henry 
was not convinced by Randolph's remarks, for when the debate 
proceeded to the next article, where the prohibition is on the states, 
he reiterated his fears that the state of Virginia would have to pay 
her share of the Continental money. He called attention to the 
rumor that the Northern states had acquired much of that money 
and would hold it at its nominal value.26 
George Mason also spoke of e% posi.t facto laws in connection with 
paper money. He held very little of this money.27 Mason main-
23 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 471. Henry's speeches were sometimes quite long 
and were always sarcastic. 
24 3 ELLIOT, 461. 
25 B£ARD, op. cit., p. 139. 
26 3 ELLIOT 471. 
21 B£ARD, op. cit., 128. 
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tained that laws passed to relieve the threatening hardship on the 
states which held little of this paper money would be declared to be 
ex post facto. 28 Madison, in making some answers to these objec-
tions, did not call attention to the fact that such laws were only 
declared ex post facto when they were in the nature of punishments 
for criminal offenses. He could not have been aware that such 
was their meaning. However, this was a poorly reported speech, 
as the latter portion of it was so low that it was not audible to many 
members of the convention.29 
George Nicholas, in speaking against Henry, denied that the 
legislature of Virginia had any right to make a law which interfered 
with the Continental debts, saying: "Have they a right to make 
ex post facto laws?" He answered his own question with an 
emphatic "No, sir!" Nicholas also couples this with the right to 
make laws impairing the obligation of contracts, which he also 
denies to the states. His opinion was that the states never could 
exercise these powers, for, "such general objects being vested in 
Congress,'' they are excluded from any power over them. In closing, 
he observed that the holders of paper money would have to make 
application to Congress for regulation and discharge of this cur-
rency. He met Henry upon the latter's ground, as though there 
was nothing wrong in using ex post facto in connection with the 
subject of paper money. 
Randolph again took the floor and asserted that if any proof were 
needed as to the true meaning of the term that proof was to be 
found in their position in the text of the Constitution, placed as 
they ai:.e in connection with the. bills of attainder. He insisted that 
the words had a technical meaning and they were so used in 
the Federal Convention.31 At this Mason launched forth into a 
harangue on the question of technical versus non-technical use of 
the words. Mas<?n argued that whatever the technical meaning 
might be it was commonly understood that the terms meant exactly 
what the words literally imported, a!).d that unless some express 
provision were made to the contrary it would be necessary for 
people to consider such to be the case, and it would devolve upon 
28 3 ELLIOl' 472. 
29 Ibid., p. 473. 
31 3 ELLIOl' 477. 
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the F.ederal judges to give them that construction. He asked: "Are 
we to trust business of this sort to technical definition ?"32 
It is interesting to note that in the debates in the Virginia con-
vention Randolph alone maintained that the words were limited to 
a criminal import. Mason, Henry, Nicholas and Madison treated 
and used the terms as though they comprehended civil and criminal 
matters. In fact, the reported debates give no evidence of their 
using the term ex post facto in connection with a criminal case. 
It does not appear in the record that Marshall took any part in the 
debate at this point. 
The only other state convention of which any debates on this 
question are recorded is that of North Carolina. It can hardly be 
an accident that the discussion which took place in the North Caro-
lina convention, like that in the Virginia convention, centered around 
the subject of paper money. In reading the North Carolina records 
one notes the lack of any reference to a criminal connotation of 
the term ex post facto. There are some direct references to civil 
matters. 
Mr. Cabarrus, speaking on the subject of bills of credit, held that 
the prohibition on the states emitting bills of credit would not affect 
paper money. His theory was that the Constitution was an instru-
ment for the future government of the United States, and not for 
the past. Furthermore, "this Constitution declares, in the most posi-
tive terms, that no ex post facto law shall be passed by the general 
government. Were this clause to operate retrospectively, it would 
clearly be ex post facto, and repugnant to the express provision of 
the Constitution. How, then, in the name of God, can the Consti-
tution take our paper money away ?"33 Here is another case of a 
use of the term ex post facto as synonymous with retrospective. 
It is another case of linking ex post facto laws with the subject of 
paper money. 
But Mr. Bloodworth took a different view. This gentleman 
wished to know if the "payment of sums now due be ex post facto."34 
He did not differ from the preceding speaker in the use of the 
phrase, as far as content and meaning is concerned. 
32 Ibid., 479. 
33 4 Er;r,10T 184 
34 Ibid., 184. 
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Perhaps the most interesting comment to be found in any of the 
reports on the clauses in point, in the state convention records, is 
that of Iredell, who was a member of the North Carolina conven-
tion. Iredell was later to sit on the bench with Justice Chase in the 
case of Calder v. Bull, concurring with the latter justice in his opin-
ion. In the Carolina convention he spoke just after Mr: Bloodworth. 
His words were as follows : "Mr. Chairman, with respect to this 
clause, it cannot have the meaning contended for. There is nothing 
in the Constitution which affects our pr~sent 'paper money. It pro-
hibits, for the fuhtre, the emitting of any, but it does not interfere 
with the paper money now actually in circulation in several states. 
There is an express clause which protects it. It provides that there 
shall be no ex post facto law. This would be ex post facto, if the 
construction contended for were right, as has been observed by 
another gentleman."35 To compare this statement with his opinion 
in the case of Calder v. Bull is interesting. · In that case he said: 
"Still, however, in the present instance, the act or resolution of the 
legislature of Connecticut cannot be regarded as an ex post facto 
law; for the true construction of the prohibition extends to crim-
inal, not to civil, cases. It is only in criminal cases, indeed, in 
which the danger to be guarded against is greatly to be appre-
hended."36 One might wonder why Iredell did not call this to the 
attention of his convention colleagues a decade earlier. He may 
have held the opinion of another justice who sat upon the same 
bench a little over a century later, that what a person may think 
subjectively, as a person or legislator, may not be what he must 
think when a judge, considering the problem objectively. What 
he may think constitutional as a legislator may be looked upon by 
the same man as unconstitutional when he is a judge.37 Another 
explanation is possible, a very simple one, namely, that Iredell had 
learned more of law in the intervening years. 
The record of one other state convention throws some light upon 
this problem. There is a reference to it in the New York conven-
tion records, though there appears to have been no debate upon the 
' . 
85 4 ELLIOT 185. (Italics by the writer.) 
86 3 Dallas 399. 
31 See comment on Justice White in article by Professor Robert E. Cush-
man, 4 MINN. L. REv. 275. 
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point in that convention. When the convention came to consider 
sections, 8, 9, and ro, these sections of article I were read by the 
secretary, and amendments were moved to them, without any debate. 
The r~cord shows that Mr. Lansing moved, "Respecting ex post 
facto laws; Provided, that the meaning of ex post facto laws shall 
not be construed to prevent calling public defaulters to account, but 
shall e,.'{tend only to crimes."38 Mr. Lansing was a lawyer, though 
not a brilliant one.39 He must have felt that there was some danger 
of a civil meaning being given to the words. His amendment was 
one of those submitted to Congress by the New York convention.40 
It will be seen, therefore, that a study of the records of the state 
conventions strengthens the conclusion arrived at following the 
study of the convention which framed the Constitution. One can 
hardly feel that the term ex post facto was intended to be limited 
to criminal cases when it was embodied in the text of the Consti-
tution. Several of the men who use the phrase as though it com-
prehended civil as well as criminal matters were lawyers. The only 
evidence which indicates that the words were used in a technical 
sense is that of Randolph in the Virginia convention. On the other 
hand, nearly every other speaker can be cited as indicating a non-
technical usage. The connection in which the term was used is of 
significance, and it has been mentioned that it was used almost 
exclusively, in the conventions, with regard to civil matters. Such 
evidence as is available as to the intent of the framers of the Con-
stitution, therefore, would tend to contradict the position taken by 
Justice Chase. 
But Justice Chase also refers to the FEDERALIST, and pays the 
author, presumably Hamilton, a high tribute. While the FEDERAL-
IST is not as authoritative as the records of the conventions, still it 
is generally recognized as carrying great weight as a commentary 
on the Constitution. There are two numbers of the FEDERALIST 
which contain comments on ex post facto laws. One is by Hamil-
ton, the other is by Madison. It is natural that Hamilton should 
consider ex post facto laws as relating to criminal cases, if BLACK-
STONE was understood to support this view, for Hamilton relies on 
38 2 ELLIOT 407. 
39 BEARD, op. cit., p. 123. 
40 FEDERALIST (Ford ed.), p. 641. 
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BLACKSTONE as his authority.41 It is therefore necessary to exam-
ine BLACKSTONE's comment on this point. After a study of the 
passage in BLACKSTONE it does not appear that he is an authority 
strictly in point. The words of Justice Johnson on this passage 
seem to analyze it accurately. After refuting the argument of Jµs-
tice Chase that Woodeson supported his view, Johnson says: "Judge 
Blackstone is by no means conclusive, if any authority at all upon 
the subject. .ARCH. & CHRIST. BLACK. 4r, OLD EDIT. 46. He is 
commenting upon the definition of a law generally; and that mem-
ber of the definition which designates it as 'a rule prescribed.' And 
when illustrating the nature and necessity of this attribute of a law, 
he illustrates it by referring to the laws of Caligula, written in 
small characters, and hung up out of view, to ensnare the people; 
and then remarks, 'There is still a more unreasonable method than 
this, which is called making of laws ex post facto; where, after an 
action, indifferent in itself, has been committed, the legislator then 
for the first time, declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a 
punishment upon the person who has committed it.' 
"This is precisely what Woodeson calls a penal statute, passed 
ex post facto; but it by no means follows, that because a penal 
statute may be ex post facto, that none other can be affected with 
that character; and certainly his commentator, Mr. Christian, in 
, his note upon the phrase 'ex post facto,' seems to have had no idea 
of this restrictive application of it. His words are: 'an ex post 
facto law may be either of a public or a private nature; and when 
we speak generally of an ex post facto law, we perhaps, always, 
mean a law which comprehends the whole community. The Roman 
privilegia seem to correspond to our bills of attainder, and bills of 
pains and penalties, which, though in their nature they are ex post 
facto laws, yet are seldom called so.' Here he speaks of a law, not 
of a penal law, which comprehends the whole community; and of 
certain penal laws, in their nature ex post facto; that is, of the 
description of ex post facto laws; which they certainly are, without 
being exclusively so.''42 
Madison is supposed to be the author of the other number of the 
4 1 FEDERALIST (Ford ed.), p. 571. Hamilton quotes directly from Black-
stone. 
42 2 Peters 684. 
EX POST FACTO IN THE CONSTITUTION 329 
FEDERALIS.T which bears on this question. But Madison does not 
give an explicit definition of the term. It is not clear that he con-
fines the meaning of the term to criminal matters.43 Madison seems 
to have consistently held to the view that ex post facto laws had a 
broader meaning than a technical use would suggest. This appears 
from his words in the Federal Convention, in the Virginia conven-
tion, and in the FEDERAI,IST. 
Justice Johnson's opinion on the other portions of the decision 
in Calder v. Bull are also interesting. It might be noted here that 
Johnson had the advantage over Chase of having access to the 
printed J oumal of the Federal Convention, which was not acces· 
sible to Chase.44 This opinion of Justice Johnson is found in a note 
appended to Satterlee v. Matthewson.45 The Justice thought that 
the decision in the Calder case caused much trouble in later years, 
for he said in Satterlee v. Matthewson: "The whole of this diffi-
culty arises out of that unhappy idea, that the phrase 'ex post facto,' 
in the Constitution of the United States, was confined to criminal 
cases exclusively; a decision which leaves a large class of arbitrary 
legislative acts without the prohibitions of the Constitution.''46 He 
then adds that he is subjoining a note which embodies the results 
of his investigation in the subject. 
In this note Johnson takes up, point by point, the argument of 
Justice Chase. Among other things, he denies to the case of Calder 
v. Bull the force of an adjudication in point. He maintains that it 
was not necessary to the disposition of the case that a decision be 
made on e.x post facto laws.47 Justice Johnson also believed that 
43 F!lDllRALlS'l', p. 295. 
44 The Journal was first published in 1819. 
45 2 Peters 38o. Appendix I, p. 68x. 
46 2 Peters 416. 
i7 Ibid., p. 682. After examining in some detail the arguments of each 
of the justices in Calder v. Bull, Johnson says: "Thus it appears that all 
the judges who sat in the case of Calder v. Bull concurred' in the opinion, 
that the decision of the court of probate, and the lapse of the time given 
for an appeal to their court of errors, were not final upon the rights of the 
parties; that there still existed in the legislature a controlling and revising 
power over the controversy; and that this was duly exercised in the reversal 
of the first decree of the court of probate. And who can doubt that the 
legislature of a state may be vested by the state constitution with such a 
power when so delegated. * * * · 
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there was a mistaken view prevalent as to the roots and original 
meaning of the term.48 He also attacks the argument that the posi-
tion of the phrase in the text of the Constitution is indicativ~ of 
its technical meaning, being placed as it is right next to the provision 
prohibiting bills of attainder. His contention in this matter may 
not be more weighty than the contention to the contrary by the 
judges in the Calder case, for it is a matter fraught with danger 
of error to depend upon such textual criticism as is involved in 
this case. But of the two arguments, that of Justice Johnson prob-
ably would appeal as the more reasonable. He said: "For by 
placing 'ex post facto' laws between bills of attainder, which are 
exclusively criminal, and laws violating the obligation of contracts, 
which are exclusively civil, it would rather seem that e:c post facto 
laws partook of both characters, was common to both purposes."40 
As to the use of the term in the state constitutions, Johnson holds 
that their use was not such as to support the view taken by Justice 
Chase. He even shows that there is ground for believing that Chase 
himself was instrumental in restricting its use so as to be limited 
to criminal cases.50 The above are among the more important obser-
vations to be found in this note by Justice Johnson, whom Story 
"How then could the question whether the phrase 'ex post facto" was 
confined to criminal laws arise in this cause? the law complained of was 
equally free from that characteristic; though the phrase be held to extend 
to laws of a civil character. I have then a right to deny that the construc-
tion intimated by three of the judges, in the case of Calder v. Bull, is entitled 
to the weight of an adjudication." 
48 Ibid., 683. 
40 Ibid., 687. 
50 Ibid., 685. "Some of the state constitutions are also referrtd to, as 
furnishing aIJi exposition of the words ex post facto, which confine its appli-
cation to criminal cases. But of the four that have been cited, it will be found 
that those of Massachusetts and Delaware do not contain the phrase; and, 
as if sensible of the general application of its meaning to all laws, giving 
effects and consequences. to past actions, which were not attached to them 
when they occurred, simply give a description of the laws they mean to 
prohibit, without resorting to the aid of a quaint phrase which can only be 
explained· by an extended periphrasis." See also ioid., 686: "Maryland first 
used it in this restricted sense, and North Carolina copied from Maryland; 
and if the evidence of contemporariesi may be relied on, Mr. Chase was one 
of the committee who reported the Constitution of Maryland; and thus 
stands the authority for the restricted . use." 
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called "learned." The fact that this opinion 'Yas expressed so late, 
1829, may account for the little heed which was paid to it. The law 
had been settled. 
A study of some of the correspondence of the prominent men 
in law and politics of that day, though not exhaustive, does not 
reveal any new information upon the problem of ez post facto 
laws and their meaning in the Constitution. There is, however, a 
very significant letter written to the governor of Connecticut, trans-
mitting a copy of the Constitution as framed by the Convention of 
1787, to be presented to the state convention for consideration. 
The writers were Sherman and Ellsworth. The latter was to 
become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in a short while. On 
that account this letter is of interest. The portion of the letter in 
point is as follows : "The restraint on the legislatures of the sev-
eral states respecting emitting bills of credit, making anything but 
money a tender in payment of debts, or impairing the obligation 
of contracts by ez post facto laws, was thought necessary as a 
security to commerce, in which the interest of foreigners, as well 
as of the citizens of the different states, may be affected."51 This 
is a very direct statement which would seem to be of weight . 
. Even at this fate day a writer of high scholastic standing has 
written: "Until 1798, the provision generally regarded as offering 
the most promising weapon against special legislation was the ex 
~ post facto clause."52 It would seem as though there have been rep-
utable authorities, both past and present, who incline to the view 
that the ez post facto provisions of the Constitution prohibited 
civil as well as criminal legislation, when judged by the intention 
of the framers of the Constitution and by the understanding of the 
people of that day. 
St. Paul, Minn. Or,~R P. Fu~r,n. 
51 See reprint in FARRAND, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 100. 
52 CoRWIN, op. cit., p. 149· 
